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INTRODUCTION 
When police misconduct reaches a boiling point in cities 
throughout the country, there is a common refrain: “call in the feds.”  
And “the feds” have often responded.  During the Obama 
Administration, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of 
Justice issued reports and entered into consent decrees with several 
police departments, including Chicago, Baltimore, Ferguson, and 
New Orleans.  The reports detailed widespread patterns and practices 
of unconstitutional stops, searches, seizures, stark racial 
discrimination, and lack of accountability for misconduct.  The 
findings exposed and explained persistent problems with policing and 
highlighted how police misconduct disproportionately affects the poor 
and people of color.1 
                                                                                                                                         
* Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York.  I owe many thanks to Sarah 
Lustbader and to Elizabeth Evans, Frank Kearl, Laura Bilder, and Becky Laitman at 
the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their thoughtful comments and edits. 
 1. In Baltimore, for example, the Civil Rights Division “identified troubling 
indications that [Baltimore Police Department] officers disproportionately use force 
during encounters with African Americans on Baltimore streets [and] found 
numerous examples of [Baltimore Police] officers using racial slurs or other 
statements that exhibit bias.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT 61 (2016) [hereinafter 
BALTIMORE REPORT].  In Ferguson, the Civil Rights Division found that among 
people arrested by Ferguson police only for an outstanding municipal warrant, 96% 
were African American. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 5 (2015) [hereinafter 
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But even during the Obama Administration, the work of the 
Justice Department failed to address another significant contributor 
to police misconduct: the Justice Department.  The very same 
problems with policing identified by the Civil Rights Division were, 
and are, exacerbated by the daily work of federal prosecutors in U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices, offices overseen by the Criminal Division of the 
Justice Department.2  This occurs because a significant number of 
federal criminal prosecutions now derive from local police arrests, 
and the prosecutors in those cases routinely obstruct efforts to 
examine the behavior of police officers.  They do so by using the 
threat of more severe sentences to dissuade the accused from going to 
trial or from filing motions to suppress evidence alleging 
constitutional violations of the exact same variety cited by the Civil 
Rights Division, such as illegal stops, searches, seizures, and 
interrogations.3   
Moreover, on the occasions when the accused risk those severe 
consequences by going to trial or filing motions to suppress, 
prosecutors fight defense efforts to access or use records showing 
prior misconduct by the officers whose conduct is at issue, and defend 
the officers to the hilt—sometimes even after a judge finds serious 
wrongdoing.4  Indeed, in New York City alone, at least twenty police 
officers testifying in federal criminal cases have been found not 
                                                                                                                                         
FERGUSON REPORT].  “Nearly 90% of documented force used by [Ferguson Police 
Department] officers was used against African Americans.  In every canine bite 
incident for which racial information is available, the person bitten was African 
American.” Id. 
 2. The Department of Justice, headed by the Attorney General, consists of many 
subject-specific divisions, including Antitrust, Civil, Civil Rights, Criminal, 
Environment and Natural Resources, and Tax. See Organization, Mission and 
Functions Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual [https://perma.cc/94BQ-HKYT].  
“The Criminal Division develops, enforces, and supervises the application of all 
federal criminal laws except those specifically assigned to other divisions.” About the 
Criminal Division, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
criminal/about-criminal-division [https://perma.cc/7T8J-8Y24].  The United States 
Attorney serves as the chief federal prosecutor in each federal judicial district. See 
28 U.S.C. § 519 (2012).  The U.S. Attorney is appointed and subject to removal by the 
President, but her work is subject to the supervision of the Attorney General. See id.; 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 3-2.110 
(1997). 
 3. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be excluded 
from use at trial. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (barring the 
use in federal court of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); see 
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule 
announced in Weeks to the States). 
 4. See infra notes 44–65 and accompanying text. 
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credible by federal judges, yet no adverse actions were ever taken 
against the officers by federal prosecutors (or by anyone else).5  
These actions by federal prosecutors are all the more significant 
because of the growth in joint local and federal investigations.  Cases 
involving drugs, gun possession, and robbery that were once 
exclusively prosecuted in state court are now routinely brought by 
federal prosecutors for the purpose of imposing more severe 
sentences and, in many instances, affording defendants fewer 
procedural rights.6  The prosecutions fall heavily on poor people of 
color: approximately eighty percent of all federal defendants are too 
poor to hire a lawyer and roughly three-quarters are non-white or 
Hispanic.7  Federal prosecutors thus rely heavily on, and protect, local 
police officers whose misconduct might, under different 
circumstances, be exposed by a Civil Rights Division investigation. 
When it comes to federal prosecutors’ role in holding police 
officers accountable for illegal conduct, public debate often focuses 
on whether prosecutors should charge an officer for excessive force in 
a high profile death, such as the shooting of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson or the choking of Eric Garner in New York City.8  Far less 
noticed is how federal prosecutors respond to allegations of police 
misconduct in the thousands of criminal cases they prosecute every 
year.  Police misconduct is routinely discovered in criminal cases.  
                                                                                                                                         
 5. See Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12guns.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2s0oNWY]. 
 6. See, e.g., David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 
122 YALE L.J. 2578, 2590–97 (2013); Ellen S. Podgor, The Tainted Federal Prosecutor 
in an Overcriminalized Justice System, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2010); 
Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress 
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2005). 
 7. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., 
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2013–14 at 1, 24 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fjs1314.pdf [https://perma.cc/35RR-ZZJ9] (showing that 77% of 
federal defendants were represented by assigned counsel—38% by federal public 
defenders and 39% by privately appointed counsel—and 22.3% of all federal 
defendants were white and non-Hispanic/Latino). 
 8. See, e.g., Shaun King, Shame on Feds for Treating Eric Garner Case Like It’s 
a Hot Potato, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 25, 2016, 2:41 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/king-shame-feds-treating-eric-garner-
case-hot-potato-article-1.2844567 [https://perma.cc/9B66-TG79]; John Surico, Are the 
Feds Finally Going to Press Charges in the Eric Garner Case?, VICE (Oct. 31, 2016, 
10:59 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7bmw7d/are-the-feds-finally-going-to-
press-charges-in-the-eric-garner-case [https://perma.cc/CTZ9-KQ8Z]; Joseph P. 
Williams, Why Aren’t Police Prosecuted?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 13, 2016, 
1:31 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-13/why-arent-police-held-
accountable-for-shooting-black-men [http://perma.cc/LG9P-4TK9]. 
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This makes sense: part of a defense lawyer’s job is to examine how 
the police engaged in an investigation.  Did the police stop or search 
someone unlawfully?  Did they conduct an illegal, coercive 
interrogation?  Are they telling the truth about how they found 
evidence?  But just because defense lawyers discover misconduct 
doesn’t mean it ever gets revealed to a judge or jury, much less the 
public or policy makers.  That is because prosecutors regularly block 
efforts to challenge any aspect of a case, including (and sometimes 
especially) claims about police misconduct. 
In this symposium celebrating the work of David Caplovitz and the 
very literal ways that the poor pay more, I explore how the poor pay 
more in another respect: in time and freedom as a result of police 
misconduct.  And I do so in the context of the federal criminal justice 
system, where the Justice Department’s Criminal Division often 
contributes to the problems the Civil Rights Division identifies in its 
investigations of police misconduct.  The troubling practices by the 
Criminal Division cut across administrations.  These practices have 
existed in Democratic and Republican regimes.  Although they have 
been more or less acute at times (for example, under President 
Obama’s Attorney General, Eric Holder, concrete policies helped 
alleviate some of the problems while under President Trump’s 
Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, new policies will exacerbate them9), 
these practices have ultimately proved to be persistent. 
It is not hard to understand why the two faces of the Justice 
Department exist.  The Civil Rights Division’s investigations into 
police departments fit squarely within its stated mission and accords 
with its history and self-perception as a defender of constitutional 
rights against state and local government actors.10  By design, federal 
authorities in those investigations are outsiders who can freely 
criticize police officers with whom they will not repeatedly work after 
the criticisms are leveled.  Their involvement is, indeed, predicated on 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., on Department 
Charging and Sentencing Policy to All Federal Prosecutors (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download 
[https://perma.cc/Z58G-CZ3Q]; Sari Horwitz & Matt Zapotosky, Sessions Issues 
Sweeping New Criminal Charging Policy, WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-issues-sweeping-
new-criminal-charging-policy/2017/05/11/4752bd42-3697-11e7-b373-
418f6849a004_story.html [https://perma.cc/6DPU-BQVM] (describing Sessions’ 
repeal of a Holder Administration policy that had restricted the use of drug charges 
carrying mandatory minimum sentences); Adam Serwer, Jeff Sessions’s Blind Eye, 
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/04/jeff-sessions-blind-eye/521946/ [https://perma.cc/8HSF-AZZ2]. 
 10. See infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
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the unwillingness or inability of local prosecutors to hold their police 
forces accountable for misconduct.11  But federal prosecutors have 
increasingly come to rely on those same state and local actors—
namely, the police and district attorneys’ offices—to bring a large 
number of their cases.  For federal prosecutors, criticizing those 
“partners” in law enforcement comes at a price.  If the Justice 
Department has acknowledged this fact, it certainly has not done so 
publicly, nor has it implemented relevant reforms. 
The incentives for federal prosecutors to shield police officers from 
claims of misconduct are especially problematic because of how much 
power federal prosecutors wield.  They can and do erect high barriers 
to challenges to police behavior—barriers that overwhelmingly 
impact the poor and racial minorities.  Scholars have written 
extensively about the problem of too much power in the hands of 
federal prosecutors, among them, overly severe sentences, diminished 
procedural rights, and wrongful convictions.12  This Essay highlights 
yet another problem: impeding the cause of police reform, as 
advocated by the Justice Department itself. 
I.  THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION AND POLICING 
The Justice Department has a well-deserved and storied reputation 
for its work advancing civil rights.  The 1957 Civil Rights Act led to 
the creation of the Civil Rights Division, charged with enforcing all 
federal statutes affecting civil rights.13  In its early years, the Division 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, The Evolving Federal Role in Bias Crime 
Law Enforcement and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 251, 274 (2008); Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. 
REV. 1447, 1449 n.7 (2016). 
 12. See, e.g., JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 72–77, 127 (2017) 
(discussing prosecutors’ role in contributing to historically high levels of 
incarceration); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
4, 300–01 (2011) (discussing how the vast increase in prosecutorial power has led to 
the collapse of the rule of law in criminal cases); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People 
Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/7VE6-LTJV] 
(“[T]he prosecutor-dictated plea bargain system, by creating such inordinate 
pressures to enter into plea bargains, appears to have led a significant number of 
defendants to plead guilty to crimes they never actually committed.”); Ronald F. 
Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 79, 132 (2005) (arguing that the federal sentencing guidelines shifted 
power from the judge to the prosecutor, thus encouraging the growth of guilty pleas). 
 13. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634; see also Wan J. 
Kim, Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at 
A Day with Justice, The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division: A Historical 
Perspective As the Division Nears 50, at 2 (Mar. 22, 2006), 
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focused on voting rights and school integration.14  With the passage of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it began to address a broad spectrum of 
public accommodation cases.15  Over the ensuing decades, with 
additional statutory authority, the Division expanded to address all 
manner of civil rights violations relating to housing, employment, 
prisons, and disabled persons.16 
Recently, the Division’s most notable civil rights work has been its 
investigations into local police departments.17  In the past two years, 
the Division issued three major reports on policing in Chicago, 
Baltimore, and Ferguson.18  Earlier investigations scrutinized New 
Orleans and Cincinnati.19  Although the reports varied in their 
emphasis, a few common themes emerged.  Police in those cities 
routinely violated the constitutional rights of residents, did so in a 
racially discriminatory manner, and were rarely held accountable for 
their misconduct. 
The report on Chicago focused on police officers’ excessive use of 
force and the city’s failure to appropriately investigate the cases.20  
The report uncovered numerous incidents in which the police “shot at 
suspects who presented no immediate threat” and used significant 
non-lethal force “against people who posed no threat” as well as 
“unreasonable retaliatory force and unreasonable force against 
children.”21  It found that the city failed to “investigate the majority 
                                                                                                                                         
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2008/10/21/historical_perspective.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PK9S-FVC2]. 
 14. See Kim, supra note 13, at 3–4. 
 15. See id. at 4–5. 
 16. See id. at 6–8. 
 17. These “pattern and practice” investigations began in earnest in response to 
the Rodney King beating, pursuant to congressional authorization of the Attorney 
General “to investigate and litigate cases involving ‘a pattern or practice of conduct 
by law enforcement officers’ that violates Constitutional or federal rights.” U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN 
AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT, at 3 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download [https://perma.cc/J26H-57SK]. 
 18. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION & U.S. 
ATTORNEY’S OFF. N.D. ILL., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
(2017) [hereinafter CHICAGO REPORT]; BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 1; 
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 1. 
 19. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION 
OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011); Memorandum of Agreement 
Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the City of Cincinnati, Ohio and the 
Cincinnati Police Department (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/
police/linkservid/EA1A2C00-DCB5-4212-8628197B6C923141/showMeta/0/ 
[https://perma.cc/F222-WV42]. 
 20. See generally CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 18. 
 21. Id. at 6. 
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of cases it is required by law to investigate.” And, in the cases the city 
did investigate, the report found that the investigations suffered from 
“serious flaws that obstruct objective fact-finding,” such as failing to 
interview key witnesses (including the officers’ themselves), 
promoting an environment of collusion among officers, and 
investigative interviewing techniques that “aimed at eliciting 
favorable statements justifying the officer’s actions rather than 
seeking the truth” by “failing to challenge inconsistencies and illogical 
officer explanations.”22 
The Baltimore Report was sweeping in its criticism of police 
misconduct.  Included among the findings were: (1) the Baltimore 
Police Department (“BPD”) routinely made unconstitutional stops, 
searches, and arrests; (2) BPD discriminated against African-
Americans in its enforcement activities; (3) BPD regularly used 
unreasonable and excessive force, in particular against juveniles and 
those with mental illness; and (4) BPD unlawfully restricted protected 
speech by detaining, arresting, and retaliating with force against 
people who engaged in protected speech.23  Like Chicago, the report 
detailed the department’s failure to properly train, supervise or hold 
police officers accountable for misconduct.24 
The Ferguson Report described a broad array of unconstitutional 
police practices that roughly mirror the findings in Baltimore, 
including unlawful stops and searches, First Amendment violations, 
use of excessive force, and discrimination against Ferguson’s African-
American residents.25  The Ferguson Report also focused on the 
particular problem of Municipal Court where revenue generation 
from fines and fees “to advance the City’s financial interests” was 
supported by the overuse and discriminatory issuance of tickets by 
police officers, practices that violated the equal protection and due 
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and imposed 
“unnecessary harm, overwhelmingly on African-American 
individuals.”26  In a particularly telling exchange quoted in the report, 
the city Finance Director wrote to the City Manager: “Court fees are 
anticipated to rise about 7.5%.  I did ask the Chief [of police] if he 
thought the PD could deliver 10% increase.  He indicated they could 
try.”27 
                                                                                                                                         
 22. Id. at 8. 
 23. BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. Id. at 2. 
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Racial bias in Ferguson was found to be rampant.  After 
controlling for other factors, the report found that African-Americans 
were far more likely to be stopped, cited, and arrested than their 
white counterparts.28  “African-Americans are more than twice as 
likely as white drivers to be searched during vehicle stops even after 
controlling for non-race based variables[.]”29  Over a two year period, 
95% of “Manner of Walking in Roadway” charges and 94% of all 
“Failure to Comply” charges were brought against African-
Americans.30  In sum, “Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement both 
reflects and reinforces racial bias, including stereotyping . . . and there 
is evidence that this is due in part to intentional discrimination on the 
basis of race.”31 
The Ferguson Report recounted a specific incident quoted in full 
here because the next section imagines how a similar scenario might 
unfold in a hypothetical federal prosecution. 
[I]n the summer of 2012, a 32-year-old African American man sat in 
his car cooling off after playing basketball in a Ferguson public park.  
An officer pulled up behind the man’s car, blocking him in, and 
demanded the man’s Social Security number and identification.  
Without any cause, the officer accused the man of being a 
pedophile, referring to the presence of children in the park, and 
ordered the man out of his car for a pat-down, although the officer 
had no reason to believe the man was armed.  The officer also asked 
to search the man’s car.  The man objected, citing his constitutional 
rights.  In response, the officer arrested the man, reportedly at 
gunpoint, charging him with eight violations of Ferguson’s municipal 
code.  One charge, Making a False Declaration, was for initially 
providing the short form of his first name (e.g., “Mike” instead of 
“Michael”), and an address which, although legitimate, was different 
from the one on his driver’s license.  Another charge was for not 
wearing a seatbelt, even though he was seated in a parked car.  The 
officer also charged the man both with having an expired operator’s 
license, and with having no operator’s license in his possession.  The 
man told us that, because of these charges, he lost his job as a 
contractor with the federal government that he had held for years.32 
Elsewhere, the report describes an officer who directed his police 
dog to bite an unarmed 14-year-old African American boy.33  A third 
                                                                                                                                         
 28. Id. at 4. 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. Id. at 4. 
 32. Id. at 3. 
 33. Id. at 31. 
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officer admitted to a clear pattern of Fourth Amendment violations: 
“when he conducts a traffic stop, he asks for identification from all 
passengers as a matter of course . . . [and if] any refuses, he considers 
that to be ‘furtive and aggressive’ conduct and cites—and typically 
arrests—the person for Failure to Comply.”34  These accounts, and 
others, are emblematic of the sort of behavior that, according to all 
three reports, has led to the erosion of trust between the police and 
residents, especially African-American residents who are most often 
the victims of police misconduct. 
The three reports are notable for their blunt appraisals of the 
problems with policing.  They do not shy away from criticizing 
unconstitutional and discriminatory conduct.  But the reports are 
silent on the role of prosecutors’ offices where police work lies at the 
heart of so many criminal cases.  The reason for the omission is 
unclear.  Perhaps consideration of local prosecutorial practice and its 
contribution to police misconduct was considered beyond the scope of 
the inquiry.  Perhaps it was seen as too politically fraught.  Or perhaps 
it was not considered at all.  Whatever reasons the Justice 
Department has to not examine local prosecutors, however, should 
not apply to an examination of its own criminal prosecutors. 
If federal prosecutors took seriously the reports of their colleagues 
in the Civil Rights Division, we might expect them to take seriously 
the claims of unlawful police conduct made by those accused of 
crimes in federal court.  We might at least expect that federal 
prosecutors would not actively discourage the airing of allegations of 
police misconduct, or that when claims are aired, prosecutors would 
not automatically meet them with resistance and retaliation.  
Furthermore, when claims of misconduct are substantiated by federal 
judges and evidence is suppressed, we might expect that federal 
prosecutors would take action to discipline or possibly charge the 
offending police officers for their unlawful activity. 
Sadly, with the rare exception of a prosecution for excessive 
force,35 none of those expectations match the reality of current 
                                                                                                                                         
 34. Id. at 21–22. 
 35. See Mark Berman & Matt Zapotosky, Chicago Cop, Once Commended for a 
Fatal Shooting, Is Indicted on Civil Rights Charges, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/16/chicago-cop-once-
commended-for-a-fatal-shooting-indicted-on-federal-civil-rights-charges 
[https://perma.cc/2UPL-PTSF] (exploring the prosecution of Officer Marco Proano). 
But see J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t 
Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-
staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html [https://nyti.ms/2jD5C4l] 
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practice.  The next section discusses the various ways that federal 
prosecutors routinely contribute to the problem of police misconduct. 
II.  THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ OFFICES AND POLICING 
Roughly eighty percent of federal criminal defendants nationwide 
are too poor to hire a lawyer and thus require assigned counsel.36  
Three-quarters of federal defendants are non-white or Hispanic.37  
The accused are sometimes arrested by local police, sometimes by 
federal agents, and sometimes by both when agencies work together 
in “joint task forces.”38  Federal criminal charges range from minor 
offenses (such as low-level drug cases, benefits fraud, or immigration 
violations) to major ones (such as terrorism, organized crime, or 
large-scale drug conspiracies).39 
No matter the offense, however, federal prosecutors often obstruct 
efforts to examine law enforcement misconduct.  First, they do so in 
the plea bargaining process in which they use their considerable 
leverage to dissuade defendants from going to trial or filing pretrial 
suppression motions.  In the federal system, less than three percent of 
defendants go to trial.40  Thirty years ago, that number was closer to 
twenty percent.41  In the intervening years, prosecutors have 
accumulated so much power (via mandatory minimum sentences 
which they can charge or not at their discretion) and leverage (via the 
sheer severity of those possible sentences), that jury trials have 
become nearly extinct.42  The loss of this most direct form of 
democracy—twelve citizens sitting in public judgment of a case—
results in a corrosive lack of transparency and accountability for the 
work of prosecutors and the police.  Moreover, federal prosecutors 
                                                                                                                                         
(examining a failure to prosecute the police officer who choked Eric Garner to 
death). 
 36. See MOTIVANS, supra note 7, at 28. 
 37. Id. at 24. 
 38. See JOHN S. DEMPSEY & LINDA S. FORST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 63 
(8th ed. 2014). 
 39. For a more expansive discussion of federal criminal practice from my 
perspective as a federal public defender, see Patton, supra note 6, at 2590–97. 
 40. See Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Ctr., Univ. at Albany, Criminal 
defendants disposed of in U.S. District Courts, by type of disposition 1945-2010, 
SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST. STAT. ONLINE (2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t5222010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GM9-37AL]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW U.S. 
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 1 (2013), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-
prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead [https://perma.cc/M6P8-CEC9]. 
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seek higher sentences for people who unsuccessfully bring motions 
alleging Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations that are rooted in 
police misconduct.43  This means that defendants must take an 
enormous risk, even without going to trial, to allege police 
misconduct, and this risk deters many from doing so. 
Second, even if a defendant is brave enough to go to trial or file a 
motion alleging police misconduct and risk additional years in prison, 
federal prosecutors often fight to prevent the disclosure of records 
showing prior instances of the officer’s misdeeds.44  And on the 
occasions when defense counsel successfully obtain the records, 
prosecutors often fight either to keep the records from being 
introduced into evidence or to prevent defense counsel from 
questioning the officers about those records.45 
Third, when a judge affirmatively finds that an officer or agent was 
not credible, the U.S Attorney’s Office takes no action to see that the 
officer is disciplined, much less charged with a crime.46  In 2008, the 
New York Times reported on the lack of consequences for police 
officers in New York City who were found to have lied in suppression 
hearings in federal court.47  The article focused on federal 
prosecutions of so-called “felon-in-possession” cases where arrests by 
local police for illegal gun possession are charged in federal court.48  
In over twenty cases, “judges found police officers’ testimony to be 
unreliable, inconsistent, twisting the truth, or just plain false.”49  The 
judges’ take on the officers’ testimony “was often withering: ‘patently 
                                                                                                                                         
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 208 F. App’x 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(finding that defendant was not entitled to the full acceptance of responsibility 
reduction because he “compelled the government to prepare and examine” a police 
officer and other witnesses in a suppression hearing); United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 
436, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting government’s argument that defendant should 
not be eligible for the full acceptance of responsibility reduction because he filed a 
suppression motion); United States v. Rogers, 129 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(affirming the denial of a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility because 
the defendant pled guilty after a suppression hearing). 
 44. From conversations with my colleagues around the country, prosecutors’ 
practices with respect to disciplinary records vary widely.  In some districts, 
prosecutors fight subpoenas issued to police departments or civilian complaint 
boards.  In others, prosecutors disclose records to the judge for an ex parte 
determination of whether it should be turned over.  In still others, prosecutors turn 
over material to the defense but then move to preclude their use at a hearing or trial.  
In my own practice in New York City, I have seen variations on all three practices 
depending on the particular prosecutor. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 5. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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incredible,’ ‘riddled with exaggerations,’ ‘unworthy of belief.’”50  And 
yet despite those stark findings about police officers’ “testilying”51 to 
cover up unconstitutional behavior, there were no consequences for 
the officers.52  “With few exceptions, judges did not ask prosecutors 
to determine whether the officers had broken the law, and 
prosecutors did not notify police authorities about the judges’ 
findings.”53  In fact, no adverse action was taken against any of the 
twenty-plus officers examined by the Times reporter who were found 
to have lied and engaged in unlawful stops, searches, and seizures.54 
In some instances, federal prosecutors do worse than merely 
nothing about police officers who are found to have engaged in illegal 
conduct; they sometimes affirmatively attempt to shield the officers.  
In one case in the Southern District of New York, a judge found 
several police officers not credible in a suppression hearing in which 
an officer justified his stop and search of a pedestrian by claiming to 
see a “bulge” in the pedestrian’s clothes consistent with a gun.55  The 
judge made numerous comments about the falsehoods of the officers 
involved, including this finding: “I give no credibility to [the police 
officer’s] statement that he saw a bulge.”56  The judge went on to 
state: “a decision was made [by the police officers] to coordinate 
among all the witnesses not to tell the full truth . . . . [Investigators] 
created a different story to justify the stop . . . . That testimony was 
false.”57  The motion was ultimately denied as moot after the defense 
accepted a plea to a reduced charge.58  After the plea, rather than 
investigate the police officers’ false statements, the prosecutors wrote 
to the judge asking him to determine that no adverse credibility 
                                                                                                                                         
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (referencing the term popularized by the Mollen Commission). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Benjamin Weiser, Judge Says Police and U.S. Agents Misled Court in 
Manhattan Gun Possession Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/nyregion/judge-says-police-and-us-agents-misled-
court-in-manhattan-gun-possession-case.html [https://nyti.ms/2xS8XSN] 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.; Order Denying Motion to Suppress, United States v. Tajuan Simmons, 
No. 1:12-cr-00416 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 27) (denying motion to suppress as 
moot in light of guilty plea). 
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findings against any of the three NYPD Officers were warranted.59  
The judge declined to reconsider and did not sanitize the record.60 
In another recent Southern District of New York case, where a 
judge found that an officer repeatedly lied in a “constantly evolving” 
story about how the officer conducted identification procedures and 
engaged in a warrantless search, the federal prosecutors again wrote 
to the judge asking her to reconsider a “limited aspect” of her ruling: 
her adverse credibility determinations about the officer.61  In their 
request, the prosecutors cited the “serious and lasting negative effects 
on a law enforcement officer’s career” of an adverse credibility 
determination,62 despite the fact that the officer in question had years 
earlier been found not credible about a search by a different federal 
judge.63  The judge denied the prosecutors’ request, finding that “the 
adverse credibility determination was necessary and central” to her 
earlier ruling.64 
These practices by federal prosecutors are all the more troubling 
because of their choices about whom to prosecute.  Federal 
prosecutors have enormous discretion in deciding which cases to 
handle, including cases that arise purely from local investigations.  
For the past twenty years, federal prosecutors around the country 
have exercised that discretion to prosecute far too many low-level 
cases that were once the sole province of local authorities.65  Thus, 
poor people of color have been subject to the harshness of federal 
sentencing laws and procedures with far greater frequency.  The 
federal prison population has exploded during the last twenty years, 
far outpacing the growth in state prisons.66  And because of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 59. See Weiser, supra note 55 (relaying the contents of the prosecutors’ letters to 
the judge). 
 60. Order Denying Motion to Reconsider, United States v. Tajuan Simmons, 
No. 1:12-cr-00416 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2013) (No. 29). 
 61. Letter Motion at 2, United States v. Chambers, 113 F. Supp. 3d 729 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 18, 2014) (No. 205). 
 62. Id. at 12. 
 63. Letter Response at 2, United States v. Chambers, 113 F. Supp. 3d 729 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015) (No. 232) (citing to the earlier adverse credibility finding 
against the same officer, Detective Ellis Deloren, in United States v. Cooper, 05 Cr. 
1139 (S.D.N.Y.)). 
 64. United States v. Chambers, 113 F. Supp. 3d 729, 745 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2015). 
 65. See, e.g., Sun Beale, supra note 6; Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the 
Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 374–75 
(2001); Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 
34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 397 (2006). 
 66. See, e.g., Growth in Federal Prison System Exceeds States’, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-
sheets/2015/01/growth-in-federal-prison-system-exceeds-states 
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vanishingly low trial rate, the people who enter those prisons are not 
doing so after public trials where police misconduct might be 
exposed.67 
To illustrate how federal prosecutors can impede scrutiny of police 
conduct, imagine the example from the Ferguson report discussed 
above and change a few facts.  Assume that the basic outline of the 
incident remains the same (a black man—we’ll call him Mr. Jones—is 
sitting in his car cooling off after a basketball game and is approached 
by an inquiring police officer), but now the police officer 1) claims 
that he had a lawful basis for the stop and search because he could 
smell marijuana coming from the car, and 2) says he found thirty 
grams of crack cocaine in the glove compartment of the car. 
Let’s further assume that pursuant to collaboration between local 
and federal law enforcement authorities,68 Mr. Jones is charged in 
federal court with a drug crime that carries a mandatory minimum of 
five years imprisonment.  Mr. Jones tells his attorney that the officer 
could not have smelled marijuana because he never smokes 
marijuana and there wasn’t any marijuana in the car.  The attorney 
notes that the police reports say nothing about finding marijuana on 
Mr. Jones or in the car during the arrest.  Based on Mr. Jones’s 
account, which the attorney finds credible, and the lack of any 
marijuana present, the attorney believes that Mr. Jones has a viable 
claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.  The attorney 
explains to Mr. Jones that at a suppression hearing (pursuant to a 
motion to exclude evidence found in an illegal search), the main 
question will be whether the judge believes the officer or Mr. Jones 
about the smell. 
The attorney will likely need to explain something else to Mr. 
Jones: in order to bring the suppression motion, Mr. Jones will have 
to risk additional time in prison.  In some districts, the prosecutor 
might offer a plea to a drug charge that does not carry a mandatory 
minimum only if Mr. Jones does not challenge the lawfulness of his 
stop and search.  In other districts, federal prosecutors may not 
condition a plea on whether Mr. Jones files the motion, but if he loses 
the motion, the prosecutors will seek a higher sentence based on 
                                                                                                                                         
[https://perma.cc/GT8F-9VH6] (showing the expansion of the federal prison 
population outpacing the states since at least 2003). 
 67. See Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Ctr., supra note 40. 
 68. Federal prosecutors might agree to take the case for any number of reasons: 
they think Mr. Jones has information to build a bigger case, as part of general law 
enforcement crackdown, or perhaps Mr. Jones has prior convictions that make him 
eligible for a particularly severe “Career Offender” sentence. See Patton, supra 
note 6. 
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some combination of Mr. Jones’s failure to “accept responsibility” or 
his “obstruction of justice” by, what in their view would be, making 
false claims about the officer’s conduct.69  In either scenario, the 
prosecutors create a strong disincentive to file a suppression motion 
because the difference in Mr. Jones’s sentence could be several years 
(for example, the difference between three and six years).70 
The ultimate decision whether to file the motion will involve many 
factors, including Mr. Jones’s risk tolerance and the attorney’s advice 
about the chances of success.  If Mr. Jones decides to risk it and files 
the motion, his attorney will likely seek to know if the police officer 
has a history of misconduct by requesting the officer’s disciplinary 
record.  In many districts, the prosecutor will oppose the request.  If 
at the end of the hearing, the judge credits Mr. Jones’s version and 
does not believe the officer to be truthful, Mr. Jones will win the 
hearing, and his case will likely be dismissed because the drugs, the 
fruit of the search, will be inadmissible at trial leaving the prosecutor 
without sufficient evidence.  But even in that scenario, where a judge 
has found that the police officer lied and engaged in unlawful, 
unconstitutional conduct, the prosecutor will not likely take any steps 
to see that the officer is disciplined.  In fact, as seen above, the 
prosecutor may affirmatively attempt to shield the officer from any 
adverse consequences.71 
The above scenario shows that an officer, who in one context is 
found by the Civil Rights Division to have engaged in serious 
misconduct, may be defended and protected by federal prosecutors in 
another.  Given the rarity of civil rights investigations into police 
departments and the frequency of federal criminal prosecutions that 
utilize local police, the latter context is surely the one receiving the 
most attention by local police officers.  The end result is a Justice 
Department that on the whole is likely doing more to perpetuate 
police misconduct than to prevent it. 
                                                                                                                                         
 69. See supra note 44. 
 70. A conviction for 30 grams of crack cocaine under the Sentencing Guidelines 
equates to a Base Offense Level of 24. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2D1.1 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2017).  If a defendant has no criminal history points and 
receives a reduction for “Acceptance of Responsibility,” he will receive three points 
off his Offense Level with a corresponding sentencing range of 37–46 months. Id.  If 
he does not receive the three-point reduction and receives an increase of two points 
for “Obstruction of Justice,” his corresponding sentencing range will be 63–78 
months. Id. 
 71. See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are two ways that the Justice Department can reconcile its 
contradictory positions on police misconduct.  The Criminal Division 
can stop supporting it or the Civil Rights Division can stop criticizing 
it.  Sadly, the current Justice Department seems to be following the 
latter path.72  As a result, the poor will surely continue to pay more as 
they bear the brunt of unlawful police activity.  However, the time 
will come when the Justice Department is headed by officials who 
state an interest in advancing police reform.  When that time comes, 
what should be done to allow for greater scrutiny of police conduct in 
routine federal criminal cases? 
The best solutions are legislative ones that have been discussed at 
length by other commentators for many sound reasons.  Those 
reforms involve ridding the system of mandatory minimum sentences 
which allow for far too much leverage by prosecutors;73 narrowing 
and modernizing the federal criminal code to avoid overlapping and 
vague charges that also lead to too much unchecked prosecutorial 
power;74 and providing greater discovery so that defendants are not 
guessing about the accusations made against them and can reasonably 
evaluate the claims of police officers.75  Each would better enable 
defendants to raise challenges to police misconduct. 
But until those more sweeping and necessary changes come, the 
Justice Department can adopt policies that do not actively impede 
efforts at police reform.  It can choose not to condition plea offers on 
the filing of suppression motions.  It can choose not to seek higher 
sentences when motions are filed and fail.  It can promptly disclose 
evidence of prior misconduct by police officers.  And it can actively 
pursue and seek to discipline officers who are found by judges to have 
lied or engaged in other misconduct.  To advance that last goal, it can 
refer those cases to the civil side of the U.S. Attorney’s Office to 
assure a more disinterested review. 
                                                                                                                                         
 72. See sources cited supra note 9; Sari Horwitz et al., Sessions Orders Justice 
Department to Review All Police Reform Agreements, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-orders-justice-
department-to-review-all-police-reform-agreements/2017/04/03/ba934058-18bd-11e7-
9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html [https://perma.cc/57R7-WG8Y]. 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(describing in detail how “the government abuses its power” by using the leverage of 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions to coerce pleas and noting the many calls 
for repeal of mandatory minimums). 
 74. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 75. See generally R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the 
Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2011). 
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These reforms are not a panacea for all police misconduct, but they 
have the benefit of being entirely within the control of the Justice 
Department.  They do not require federal officials to order anything 
of state and local actors.  Indeed, they only require that the Justice 
Department listen to itself. 
 
